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This paper analyses the effect of National Numerical Fiscal Rules (FRs) upon fiscal discipline 
in 74 developing countries over the period 1990-2007.  It is the first study that assesses the 
impact of FRs on budgetary outcomes while controlling for the self-selection problem. It finds 
that the effect of FRs on structural fiscal balance is significantly positive, robust to a variety 
of alternative specifications, and varies with the type of FRs. It also finds that the treatment 
effect differs according to countries characteristics: number of FRs, time length since FRs 
adoption, presence of supranational FRs, government fractionalisation and government 
stability. 
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The recent global recession and financial crisis, along with the policy actions taken to 
buffer their effects, have eroded fiscal positions in several countries, raising concerns about 
the sustainability of public finances. Policymakers are therefore urged to undertake 
appropriate measures to put back public finances on a sustainable path. To this end, the 
establishment of fiscal rules appears inter alia, as a good candidate. Indeed, fiscal rules –FRs 
hereafter- are “a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary 
indicator of fiscal performance” (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). Well designed and 
implemented, they are able to strengthen fiscal credibility and fiscal discipline, in that they 
place a durable constraint on the discretion of fiscal authorities (Alesina and Perotti, 1995; 
Debrun et al., 2007; Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998; von Hagen, 1992; von Hagen and 
Harden, 1995; Inman, 1996; and Poterba, 1996). First started in the developed countries, the 
new wave of FRs has gained the developing world.1 To date, twenty-five low-income and 
middle-income countries have adopted FRs at the national level to frame the conduct of their 
fiscal policy (IMF, 2009).  
Parallel to this growing appetite for FRs in developing countries, a few papers attempted 
to evaluate their effectiveness in shaping fiscal behaviours in these countries. Alesina et al. 
(1999) are the first study to assess the impact of FRs in developing countries, namely in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Thereafter, Dabla-Norris et al. (2010), Gollwitzer (2011), 
Hallerberg et al. (2009), Poter and Diamond (1999), and Prakash and Cabezon (2008) 
analysed the effect of FRs and found that they improve fiscal discipline in developing 
countries. But a drawback, common to all these existing studies, is that they ignore the self-
selection problem in policy adoption, which might bias the estimate of the effect of FRs in 
                                                 
1
 The new wave of FRs, whose implementation is accompanied by a greater transparency contrary to the older ones, started in 
New Zealand in 1994 (Kopits, 2001). 
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these early studies. A more formal re-evaluation of the impact of FRs, taking into account the 
self-selection problem in policy adoption is therefore necessary. 
The aim of this paper is therefore to assess the effect of FRs on fiscal developments, by 
addressing carefully the issue of self-selection this time. To this end, we make use of a variety 
of propensity scores-matching and a wide panel of 74 developing countries, of which 22 have 
introduced rule-based fiscal frameworks by the end of 2007, to evaluate the treatment effect 
of FRs. In the literature related to monetary policy, such methods have been used to evaluate 
the impact of inflation targeting, a monetary policy framework where self-selection is 
potentially also at work (Lin and Ye, 2007). But to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the 
first study to take into account this self-selection problem while investigating the impact of 
FRs. More precisely, throughout the paper, we aim to answer the following questions: do 
national numerical FRs improve fiscal discipline as measured by the cyclically-adjusted 
primary fiscal balance (CAPB), after controlling for self-selection? Does the treatment effect 
vary with the types of rules (Budget Balance Rules, Expenditure Rules and Debt rules)? 
Finally, is there heterogeneity in the treatment effect of FRs, depending on countries 
structural characteristics? We explore five possible sources of heterogeneities: number of FRs 
in place, time length since FRs adoption, presence of supranational FRs, government 
fractionalisation and government stability. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the second section describes the econometric 
methodology and introduces the dataset. Section 3 shows the propensity scores-matching 
results while section 4 considers some robustness checks. In section 5, we explore the 
heterogeneity feature of the treatment effect of FRs using a control function regression 
approach. Section 6 briefly concludes and draws some policy recommendations. 
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2. The data 
Our dataset consists of 74 developing countries examined over the period 1990-2007.2  
The panel is unbalanced because of missing observations. The time coverage of the sample is 
1990-2007 because it is a common feature that reliable fiscal data exist only from early 1990s 
to 2007 at most, especially in developing countries. The sample is composed of 22 countries 
that have adopted FRs at the national level by the end of 2007 (called FRers) and 52 non-
FRers. To make sure that the control group is a good counterfactual of the treatment group, 
that is the two groups are reasonably comparable, we include in the control group only non-
FRers developing countries that have a real GDP per capita at least as large as that of the 
poorest FRer and with a population size at least as large as that of the smallest FRer.3 The 22 
treated countries and the 52 control countries that satisfy these criteria are listed in the first 
two columns and the last three columns of Appendix 1 respectively.  
The FRers along with their starting dates have been taken from the Fiscal Rules Database 
by the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, Fiscal Policy and Surveillance Division (2009) 
which gives a comprehensive overview on FRs experiences around the world at the national 
level as well as at the supranational level.4 Nevertheless, we choose to focus on national FRs 
for two reasons. First, supranational rules generally suffer from a problem of insufficient 
enforcement and compliance so that the member countries frequently violate these rules 
without any sanctions. The most obvious examples are some countries from the European 
Union, the WAEMU and the CEMAC (Prakash and Cabezon, 2008).5 These rules therefore 
look like simple ornaments. Accordingly, it seems better to focus on FRs experiences at the 
national level which most of time result from a real political commitment. Second, by 
                                                 
2
 The developing countries category considered here refers to the World Bank classification, thus including low-income as 
well as middle-income countries. 
3
 The poorest FRer in our sample is Kenya with a real per capita GDP of 2025.179 in 2007 while the smallest FRer in terms 
of population size is Cape Verde (with 424395 inhabitants in 2007). 
4
 The database is available at www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/121609.pdf. 
5
 West African Monetary and Economic Union (WAEMU) involves eight countries of West Africa, while the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) is composed of six countries of Central Africa. 
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distinguishing the national FRs from the supranational ones, as in Debrun et al. (2008) and 
IMF (2009), we are able to analyse in the probit estimates of the propensity scores, the 
influence of having supranational rules on the decision to introduce national FRs. Better, this 
allows us to explore whether or not the presence of rule-based fiscal frameworks at the 
supranational level influences the treatment effect of the national FRs. 
It is worthnoting that in the existing literature, the effectiveness of FRs is assessed using 
not only the presence of numerical targets or limits on fiscal aggregates, but also employing 
other aspects related to the strength or intensity of these rules. These include their statutory 
basis, the sanctions for breaking the rules, the procedures required to modify or amend the 
rules, the share of government finances covered by rules and fiscal transparency. However, 
the propensity-scores matching used in this paper allows building a binary measure of FRs 
only, indicating the presence or not of rule, but not to build a synthetic FRs index 
summarising the other aspects mentioned above. Furthermore, even though it would be 
possible to analyse the importance of the strength of the rules when we will explore the 
heterogeneity feature of the treatment effect of FRs using a control function regression 
approach, most of these aspects related to the strength of FRs are missing for many countries 
in our sample. Attempting to analyse the influence of the strength of the rule on the treatment 
effect of FRs will imply a significant reduction in our sample size. Accordingly, we choose to 
use only the simple binary measure of FR.  
Table 1 displays the 22 FRers along with their starting dates. Excepted Indonesia which 
has implemented FRs in 1967, most countries started at the end of 1990s or early 2000s. 60 
per cent of FRers have adopted Budget Balance Rules (BBR), 36% have adopted Expenditure 
Rules (ER) and 55 per cent have opted for Debt Rules (DR). Only two countries, namely 
Kenya and Nigeria have enacted Revenue Rules (RR).6  
                                                 
6
 Madagascar (2006), Mexico (2006), Equatorial Guinea (2007) and Mauritius (2008) adopted FRs, but given that our sample 
ends up in 2007, we still treat them as non-FRers. The Union of the Comoros (2001), Namibia (2001), Liberia (2004) and 
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Table 1: Fiscal Rules countries along with their starting dates 
Countries 
Starting Dates 
National Numerical Fiscal Rule 
BBR ER RR DR 
Angola 2005 2005 
Argentina 2000 2000 2000 2000 
Bulgaria 2003 2003 
Brazil 2000 2000 2000 2001 
Botswana 2003 2003 
Cape Verde 1998 1998 1998 
Chile 2000 2000 
Costa Rica 2001 2001 
Czech Republic 2005 2005 
Ecuador 2003 2003 2003 
Estonia 1993 1993 
India 2004 2004 
Indonesia 1967 1967 2004 
Israel 1992 1992 2005 
Kenya 1997 1997 1997 
Lithuania 1997 1997 
Nigeria 2004 2004 
Pakistan 2005 2005 2005 
Panama 2002 2002 2002 
Peru 2000 2000 2000 
Poland 1997 1997 
Sri Lanka 2003 2003 2003 
          Source: Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF (2009). www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/121609.pdf BBR=Budget Balance Rule;  
   ER=Expenditure Rule; RR=Revenue Rule; DR: Debt Rule. 
 
In the econometric analysis below, FR is a dummy variable equalling one, if in a given 
country at a given year a numerical constraint exists on any fiscal aggregate at the national 
level (budget balance, spending, revenue or debt). BBR, ER, RR and DR are dummies 
variables equalling one, if in a given country at a given year a numerical constraint is placed 
only on budget balance, expenditure, revenue and debt respectively.7  
                                                                                                                                                        
Timor-Leste (2005) also adopted FRs, but due to lack of available data on fiscal balances, they are not included in our 
sample.  
7
 The numerical constraints are generally expressed as a ceiling or a target. For instance, the BBR may target a specific budget 
balance in nominal terms, a specific budget balance as a percentage of GDP or a specific budget balance as a percentage of 
GDP in cyclically-adjusted or structural terms. The DR may target a specific amount of debt in nominal terms; a specific 
debt-to-GDP ratio or may establish a ceiling for the Government debt in level or as a % of GDP. The ER may specify a 
ceiling on the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, a ceiling on current expenditure growth or expenditure limits inserted in a medium-
term expenditure framework. Finally, the RR may specify desired developments of the tax base, a target for revenue-to-GDP 
ratio or a ceiling on the use of oil revenues. 
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Fiscal data come from the IMF World Economic Outlook (2010). Our measure of fiscal 
discipline is the Structural or Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Fiscal Balance, as GDP percentage 
(CAPB). It is the difference between General Government revenues and expenditures 
excluding interest payments, adjusted for the effect of business cycle fluctuations. This is a 
measure of discretionary fiscal behaviour, that is fiscal policy changes really imputable to 
current fiscal policymakers, in that it not only excludes the effects of past fiscal policy 
decisions (interest payments) but also filters out the impact of automatic stabilisers on the 
primary balance. To compute the CAPB, in line with the so-called “residuals” approach (Fatás 
and Mihov, 2006; 2003) we estimate the following fiscal policy reaction function adapted 




















is the primary fiscal balance, for country i at year t, 
i
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a set of control variables. The output gap is calculated as the difference between the logarithm 
of real GDP and the logarithm of a Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend of real GDP (with 100 as 
smoothing parameter).9 Control variables include inflation and a time trend. The λ coefficient 




ε  measures the unsystematic component of fiscal policy. The estimated value of this 
latter catches the part of primary fiscal balance unexplained by economic conditions and is 
our measure of fiscal discipline (CAPB).10 To correct for a potential endogeneity of output 
gap in equation (1), we use the two stages least squares (2SLS) method and instrument the 
                                                 
8
 In the literature, the CAPB is also calculated using a three-step procedure, especially in several international organisations 
(OECD, IMF or European Commission, see Girouard and André, 2005). First, they calculate a measure of potential GDP. 
Second, to estimate the budget balance that is due to business cycle fluctuations, they apply the elasticity of government 
revenues and expenditures, to the deviation between the effective GDP and the potential GDP. Third, they deduct the CAPB 
by subtracting the budget balance estimated in the second step, from the primary fiscal balance actually observed. Although 
very attractive, this methodology is very intensive in detailed data, namely in the estimation of revenue and expenditure 
elasticity. As such detailed information does not exist in developing countries we rather focus on the “residuals” approach. 
9
 We have also used 6.25 as smoothing parameter, but this does not change significantly the estimation results. 
10
 Note that Fatás and Mihov (2003; 2006) rather took the standard deviation of the error term (and not the error term itself) 
because they were interested in the volatility of fiscal policy (and not fiscal policy itself). 
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output gap with its lagged value.The 2SLS-based results (see Appendix 10) indicate that in 
69% of cases (51 of 74 countries), the F-statistics associated with the instrumentation 
equations are above the rule of thumb of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997), suggesting that the 
lagged output gap is reasonably a strong instrument. This result is reinforced by the analysis 
of the Shea's Partial R2 statistics, which shows that in more than 85% of cases (63 of 74 
countries), the Partial R2 are above the rule of thumb of 20.  
We also use the same methodology displayed in (1) to calculate a measure of Cyclically-
Adjusted-Primary Expenditure (CAPE). We use this latter to evaluate the impact of 
Expenditure Rule (ER) on a measure of government spending filtered out from the influence 
of economic conditions. Regarding the assessment of the impact of Debt Rule (DR) on 
government debt developments, we use a recent central government debt database collected 
by Ali Abbas et al. (2010). Descriptive statistics, definitions and sources of the other variables 
can be found in Appendices 8 and 9. 
As depicted in Figure 1 (see Appendix 7), the treated countries (FRers) improved their 
CAPB between the pre-FR period and the post-FR period, their CAPB passing from -0.8 (as 
GDP percentage) to 1 (as GDP percentage). Meanwhile, the CAPB in the control group 
(which is around 0, as GDP percentage) decreased slightly between the pre-FR period and the 
post-FR period.11  This seems to give a first indication that FRs adoption improves fiscal 
discipline. A similar finding can be viewed in Figures 2 and 3 (see Appendix 7) where we use 
the CAPE and government debt as alternative measures of fiscal performances respectively. 
Indeed, the CAPE decreased between the pre-FR period and the post-FR period in treated 
countries while it increased in the control group. Regarding public debt, it decreased between 
the pre-FR period and the post-FR in the treated countries as well as in the control group, but 
                                                 
11
 Note that as this is done in the literature related to inflation targeting, the post-FR period for the non-FRers has been 
defined as the mid between the first FRs adoption date in our sample (Indonesia started FRs in 1967, but given that our 
sample begins in 1990, this latter becomes therefore the starting date of FRs for Indonesia) and the ending date in our sample 
(2007), that is 1998. 
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more in the first group. Nevertheless, are these naive correlations corroborated by a more 
rigorous econometric analysis? In the next section, we assess the impact of FRs more 
formally, by controlling for the self-selection problem in policy adoption. 
 
3. Methodology 
Our objective is to evaluate the treatment effect of FRs on fiscal discipline. To this end, 
we consider the adoption of FRs by a country as a treatment, just as in the program evaluation 
literature in microeconomic studies. Consistently with this literature, we refer to the countries 
having adopted FRs –FRers hereafter- as the treated group, and to the non-FRers as the 
control group. Then, the average effect of being a FRer on fiscal discipline,  the so-called 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT), can be expressed as follows: 
]1FRY[E]1FRY[E]1FR)YY[(EATT i0ii1ii0i1i =−===−=               (2)    
where iFR  is the fiscal rule dummy variable in country i. 1iY  is the value of the outcome 
variable when the country i has adopted FRs and 0iY  if not. 1FR/Y i0i =  is the outcome value 
that would have been observed if a FRer had not adopted FRs policy, and  1FR/Y i1i =  the 
outcome value really observed on the same FRs country. Equation (2) is telling us that a 
simple comparison between the outcome value (fiscal discipline in our case) observed in the 
treatment group and the outcome value observed in the same countries if they had not adopted 
FRs would give us an unbiased estimate of the ATT. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
observe this latter outcome value since we cannot observe the fiscal performance a FRer had 
it not adopted FRs. We face here, as it is common in non-experimental studies, an 
identification problem.  
A common approach to circumvent this difficulty is to compare the sample mean 
budgetary outcome of the treatment group with that of the control group if and only if 
assignment to the treatment is random. However, FRs adoption may be non-random, as FRs 
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may be correlated with a set of observable variables that also affects the outcome variable, 
leading to the so-called self-selection problem.12 Simple comparison of the sample mean 
budgetary outcome between the two groups would then produce biased estimates of the ATT. 
As in Lin and Ye (2007), to address this problem of selection on observables, we make use of 
a variety of propensity scores-matching methods recently developed in the treatment 
literature.  
3.1. Matching on Propensity-Scores 
 Propensity Scores-Matching (PSM hereafter) consists of pairing FRers with non-FRers 
which have similar observed characteristics, so that the difference between the outcome of a 
FRer and that of a matched counterfactual is attributable to the treatment (FRs adoption). A 
key assumption needed to apply PSM is “conditional independence” )XFRY,Y( 10 ⊥
 
which 
requires that conditional on the observables (X), the outcome be independent of the treatment 
variable. Under this assumption, equation (2) can be rewritten as:  
]X,0FRY[E]X,1FRY[EATT ii0iii1i =−==                                            (3) 
where we have replaced ]X,1FRY[E ii0i =  with ]X,0FRY[E ii0i =  which is observable. Yet, 
as the number of covariates in X increases, matching on X would be difficult to implement in 
practice; to overcome this high dimension problem, we follow Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) 
and base the matching on the propensity scores (instead of X ). The propensity score (PS 
hereafter) is the probability of adopting the IT regime, conditional to the observable 
covariates ( X ), namely  
( ) ( )iiiii X1ITPr]XIT[EXp ===                             (4). 
Under a final assumption needed for the validity of the PSM (the so-called “common 
support assumption” ( ) 1<iXp , namely the existence of some comparable control units for 
each treated unit), we estimate the ATT as                                                                
)]X(p,0FRY[E])X(p,1FRY[EATT ii0iii1i =−==                                        (5).     
                                                 
12
 It is worthnoting that the Propensity Scores-Matching method does not implicitly account for the unobservables; as a result, the issues it addresses differ from those related to selection 
on unobservables (omitted variables) as well as from a Heckman-type sample selection problem (see Dehejia and Wahba, 2002, and Heckman et al., 1998 for further details). 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.04 
12 
 
      3.2. Estimating the propensity scores (PS) 
We estimate the PS using a probit model with the binary variable FR as the dependent 
variable. Our baseline selection equation includes past fiscal development variables 
(Cyclically-Adjusted Primary budget Balance-CAPB- and Debt, both as GDP percentage, and 
lagged one ear), the real per capita GDP growth rate, dependency ratio, government stability, 
government fractionalisation, inflation and a dummy for the presence of a supranational FR.  
We expect FRs to be introduced more likely in fiscally healthier countries, since the public 
credibility regarding the ability of government to meet its announced targets for fiscal 
aggregates is the cornerstone of FRs (Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008; and IMF, 2009). 
Accordingly, we expect a positive correlation between the probability of FRs adoption and the 
lagged value of CAPB, but a negative correlation with the lagged value of public debt.13 We 
also expect FRs to be adopted more likely in countries with good macroeconomic 
performances (IMF, 2009). As a result, the expected signs on the estimated coefficients of real 
per capita GDP growth rate and inflation are positive and negative respectively.  Countries 
with higher dependency ratio, which implies generally higher public fiscal burden, are less 
likely to adopt rule-based fiscal frameworks (Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008). We 
therefore expect a negative correlation between FRs adoption and dependency ratio, that is the 
ratio of dependents (people younger than 15 or older than 64) to working-age population 
(those ages 15-64). Regarding the politico-institutional factors, we expect a positive link 
between the probability of adopting FRs and the fragmentation of government. Indeed, 
according to the “tying their hands” approach, FRs introduction can be viewed as a 
mechanism to rule out the deficit bias originating from the so-called “common-pool” problem 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995; and Debrun et al., 2008). The expected sign on government 
stability is ambiguous a priori. Indeed, on the one hand, greater government stability may 
                                                 
13
 It is worthnoting that the relationship might be non-linear for public debt, with the likelihood of FRs introduction 
increasing below a give threshold, while decreasing above that threshold. We check for such a non-linear effect in section 4. 
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lead to lower deficit bias, which in turn should be associated positively with FRs adoption. On 
the other hand, government instability, that is the inability of the government to stay in office 
and carry out its declared programs, may encourage governments to tie their hands through 
FRs adoption in order to ensure fiscal discipline despite the succession of different executive 
teams. In this spirit, greater government stability might be less conducive to FRs adoption.  
Finally, we expect a positive link between the supranational fiscal rule dummy and FRs 
adoption at the national level, as the presence of supranational fiscal rule may catalyse the 
introduction of the national ones (Debrun et al., 2008; and IMF, 2009). Table 2 below reports 
the probit estimates of the PS.14   
Table 2: Probit estimates of the propensity scores 
Dependent Variable Fiscal Rule (FR)  Dummy Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
CAPB (GDP%) lagged one year 0.045** 0.047*** 0.045** 0.044** 0.044** 0.047** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Public Debt (GDP %) lagged one year -0.005** 0.002 -0.005* -0.004* -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Real per capita GDP growth rate 0.032** 0.028** 0.033** 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.032** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Dependency ratio -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Government stability -0.121*** -0.125*** -0.121*** -0.104*** -0.123*** -0.118*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) 
Government fractionalisation 0.383* 0.386* 0.384* 0.345* 0.367* 0.343* 
 (0.205) (0.204) (0.205) (0.207) (0.203) (0.206) 
Inflation -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Supranational FR Dummy 0.049 0.006 0.046 0.055 0.124 0.048 
 (0.178) (0.180) (0.183) (0.183) (0.184) (0.179) 
Squared public debt (lagged one year)  -0.178**     
  (0.081)     
Logarithm of Real per capita GDP   0.011    
   (0.130)    
Quality of the bureaucracy    0.251***   
    (0.069)   
Trade Openness     -0.002  
     (0.002)  
International Official Reserves to GDP      -0.001 
      (0.004) 
Number of observations 772 772 772 772 772 757 
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.107 0.100 0.114 0.102 0.100 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Constants included (but not reported).*, **, and ***: significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
                                                 
14
 According to the conditional independence assumption, omitting in the probit model, variables that systematically affect 
the probability of enacting FRs but do not affect budgetary outcomes, has little influence on results (Persson, 2001). In other 
words, an estimate bias occurs only if we omit an explanatory variable that simultaneously affect fiscal discipline and the 
probability of adopting FRs. We give much attention to this issue when selecting variables into the probit model. 
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Column [1] displays the probit results with FR as the dependent variable. Recall that FR is 
a dummy variable equalling one, if in a given country at a given year a numerical constraint 
exists on any fiscal aggregate (budget balance, expenditure, or debt). Most coefficients are 
significant and have the expected signs. Lagged CAPB, real per capita GDP growth rate, 
government fractionalisation and supranational FR dummy are correlated positively with FRs 
adoption. Note however that the estimated coefficient on supranational FR dummy is not 
significantly different from zero. Lagged government debt, dependency ratio and inflation are 
negatively associated with the probability of adopting FRs. Finally, the sign of the estimated 
coefficient on government stability is negative, suggesting that FRs in our sample are 
introduced for “tying their hands” reasons. Column [1] of Appendices 2, 3 and 4 display the 
probit results for Budget Balance Rule (BBR), Expenditure Rule (ER) and Debt Rule (DR) 
respectively. The results remain almost identical to those of Table 2, except in some cases.15 
 
3.3. Results from matching on propensity scores. 
 
Based on the PS estimated above, we employ four commonly used methods to match each 
FRer with non-FRers, depending on the closeness of their scores to that of the FRer.16 First, 
the nearest neighbour matching with replacement, which matches each treated country to the 
N  control countries that have the closest PS (we use 1=N , 2=N  and 3=N ). Second, the 
radius matching, which performs the matching based on PS falling within a certain radius or 
“caliper” R  (we use a small radius R=0.005, a medium radius R=0.01 and a wide radius 
R=0.05). The third method is the regression-adjusted local linear matching developed by 
Heckman et al. (1998). Fourth, we consider the kernel matching, which matches a FRer to all 
non-FRers weighted proportionally to their closeness to the treated country. As the matching 
                                                 
15
 The estimated coefficient on lagged public debt becomes positive with BBR and DR, but remains negative (although not 
statistically significant) with ER. The estimated coefficient on the supranational dummy becomes negative with BBR and ER 
but proved to be not significantly different from zero. 
16
 While matching FRers to non-FRers, we employ the “common support” option. With this option, we exclude the treated 
countries whose the PS is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum PS of the untreated countries. 
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estimator presents no analytical variance, we compute standard errors by bootstrapping (that 
is by re-sampling the observations of the control group, see Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). 
The upper panel of Table 3 (line [1]) reports the estimated ATT of FRs on the CAPB. 
Irrespective of the matching method, the estimation results show that FRs adoption does 
improve fiscal discipline, as the estimated ATT is positive and statistically significant. The 
amplitude of the estimated ATT ranges from 0.642 (kernel matching) to 1.180 percentage 
points of GDP (1-Nearest-neighbour), suggesting that on average, FRs adoption enhances the 
CAPB by 0.642 and 1.180 percentage points of GDP respectively. Does the discipline-
enhancing effect of FRs vary depending on the type of rule (BBR, ER, DR)? The upper panel 
(line [1]) of Tables 4, 5 and 6 address this issue.17   
Panel [1] of Table 4 reports the ATT with BBR as the treatment variable and the CAPB as 
the budgetary outcome. The ATTs still are positive, suggesting that placing numerical 
constraints on the budget balance allows enhancing the CAPB. But the statistical significance 
and the magnitude of the estimated ATTs decrease slightly with respect to those estimated 
with FR as treatment variable (Panel [1] of Table 3). Panel [1)] of Table 5 reports the 
estimated ATT with this time, ER as the treatment variable, and Cyclically-Adjusted Primary 
Expenditure (CAPE) as the budgetary outcome. Irrespective of the matching estimator, the 
estimation results show that ER adoption does reduce the CAPE. The amplitude of the ATT is 
even higher than that estimated in panel [1] of Table 3 and 4: it extends from -0.866 (local 
linear regression matching) to -1.612 (1-Nearest-neighbor) percentage points of GDP. Finally, 
panel [1] of Table 6 displays the matching results for DR. The estimated ATTs are not 
statistically different from zero, suggesting that in our sample, countries having enacted DR 
do not perform better than countries that did not introduce DR, in terms of government debt 
developments. But one might be cautious in interpreting this last result. Indeed, the lack of 
                                                 
17We do not assess the effect of revenue rule (RR) because only two countries (Kenya and Nigeria) enacted RR in our sample. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.04 
16 
 
significance of the estimated ATT, and to a lesser extent the fact that in some cases the sign of 
the ATT of DR is even positive, might be due to the inability of the simple binary measure of 
DR to account for the other important aspects –enforcement, monitoring, transparency, 
sanctions- necessary for the success of any rules. 




















     r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05       
Fiscal Rule (FR) Dependent variable: Cyclically-Adjusted Budget Balance (CAPB, GDP %) 
[1]: Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) 1.180*** 0.828** 0.820** 0.772*** 0.691*** 0.644*** 0.685*** 0.642*** 
 
(0.424) (0.389) (0.357) (0.289) (0.263) (0.244) (0.259) (0.246) 
Number of Treated observations 128 128 128 125 127 128 128 128 
Number of Control observations 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 
 Robustness Checks 
[2]: Adding squared public debt (lagged) 1.250* 0.762* 0.750** 0.675** 0.690*** 0.715*** 0.737*** 0.698*** 
 
(0.697) (0.409) (0.364) (0.294) (0.260) (0.241) (0.262) (0.239) 
[3]: Adding Logarithm of Real per capita GDP 1.405** 1.373** 1.248** 1.170** 1.099** 1.138** 1.206*** 1.144** 
 
(0.594) (0.549) (0.510) (0.505) (0.466) (0.463) (0.440) (0.458) 
[4]: Adding Quality of the bureaucracy 1.218* 1.365* 1.355** 1.416*** 1.248** 1.225*** 1.222*** 1.224*** 
 
(0.708) (0.704) (0.646) (0.538) (0.502) (0.446) (0.471) (0.448) 
[5]: Adding Trade Openness 1.980*** 1.760*** 1.567*** 1.333*** 1.375*** 1.200*** 1.344*** 1.215*** 
 
(0.672) (0.593) (0.543) (0.493) (0.482) (0.465) (0.485) (0.463) 
[6]: Adding International Official Reserves to GDP 1.872*** 1.590*** 1.455** 1.330*** 1.276** 1.259*** 1.297*** 1.270*** 
 
(0.570) (0.571) (0.568) (0.478) (0.497) (0.474) (0.490) (0.475) 
Note: bootstrapped standard errors (via 500 replications) in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 




















     r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05       
Budget Balance Rule (BBR) Dependent variable: Cyclically-Adjusted Budget Balance (CAPB, GDP %) 
[1]: Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) 0.707 0.810* 0.676* 0.588* 0.486* 0.465* 0.417* 0.478** 
 
(0.488) (0.441) (0.403) (0.345) (0.247) (0.260) (0.272) (0.243) 
Number of Treated observations 80 80 80 78 78 80 80 80 
Number of Control observations 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 
 Robustness Checks 
[2]: Adding squared public debt (lagged) 0.826* 1.051** 1.137** 1.049*** 1.070*** 1.083*** 1.034*** 1.083*** 
 
(0.493) (0.459) (0.453) (0.379) (0.365) (0.359) (0.360) (0.360) 
[3]: Adding Logarithm of Real per capita GDP 0.640* 0.437 0.789** 0.816** 0.942** 0.965** 0.901** 0.961** 
 
(0.326) (0.411) (0.394) (0.376) (0.367) (0.377) (0.369) (0.377) 
[4]: Adding Quality of the bureaucracy 0.791* 0.909** 1.020** 0.897** 0.923** 0.919** 0.830** 0.910** 
 
(0.469) (0.436) (0.425) (0.394) (0.394) (0.384) (0.394) (0.384) 
[5]: Adding Trade Openness 1.283*** 1.188*** 1.213*** 1.204*** 1.212*** 1.242*** 1.157*** 1.240*** 
 
(0.469) (0.427) (0.388) (0.345) (0.347) (0.353) (0.345) (0.350) 
[6]: Adding International Official Reserves to GDP 1.112** 1.177*** 1.146*** 1.187*** 1.168*** 1.220*** 1.164*** 1.142*** 
 
(0.453) (0.434) (0.424) (0.381) (0.377) (0.364) (0.355) (0.360) 
Note: bootstrapped standard errors (via 500 replications) in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
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     r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05       
Expenditure Rule (ER) Dependent variable: Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Expenditure (CAPE, GDP %) 















Number of Treated observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Number of Control observations 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 
 Robustness Checks 
[2]: Adding squared public debt (lagged) -1.322*** -1.262*** -1.227*** -1.002*** -0.983*** -0.925*** -0.911*** -0.933*** 
 
(0.492) (0.453) (0.404) (0.355) (0.317) (0.285) (0.296) (0.285) 
[3]: Adding Logarithm of Real per capita GDP -0.891* -0.757* -0.784* -0.730** -0.753** -0.777** -0.868*** -0.779** 
 
(0.514) (0.448) (0.406) (0.355) (0.352) (0.318) (0.329) (0.319) 
[4]: Adding Quality of the bureaucracy -1.085** -0.805* -0.897** -0.554 -0.782** -0.926*** -0.838** -0.917*** 
 
(0.491) (0.478) (0.447) (0.375) (0.367) (0.329) (0.340) (0.325) 
[5]: Adding Trade Openness -1.158** -1.040** -1.167*** -1.037*** -1.092*** -1.037*** -1.079*** -1.050*** 
 
(0.514) (0.471) (0.451) (0.322) (0.322) (0.299) (0.323) (0.301) 
[6]: International Official Reserves to GDP -1.310*** -0.735* -0.800** -0.807** -0.853*** -0.947*** -0.929*** -0.938*** 
 
(0.493) (0.420) (0.377) (0.336) (0.326) (0.271) (0.282) (0.271) 

























     r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05       
Debt Rule (DR) Dependent variable: Public Debt (GDP %) 















Number of Treated observations 73 73 73 72 73 73 73 73 
Number of Control observations 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 
 Robustness Checks 
[2]: Adding squared public debt (lagged) 0.601 1.456 0.0732 -0.858 -0.790 -3.322** -0.734 -2.806** 
 
(2.695) (2.587) (2.349) (1.302) (1.237) (1.290) (1.286) (1.251) 
[3]: Adding Logarithm of Real per capita GDP -0.839 1.736 1.199 -0.259 -0.811 -4.269*** -0.425 -3.762*** 
 
(3.194) (2.753) (2.544) (1.451) (1.347) (1.281) (1.309) (1.253) 
[4]: Adding Quality of the bureaucracy -0.263 1.631 0.253 -0.906 -0.770 -3.848*** -1.018 -3.338** 
 
(3.758) (3.167) (3.122) (1.845) (1.603) (1.353) (1.457) (1.322) 
[5]: Adding Trade Openness -7.097* -5.461* -4.526 -2.490 -2.470 -4.583*** -2.588 -4.503*** 
 
(3.821) (3.170) (2.790) (1.818) (1.743) (1.418) (1.581) (1.430) 
[6]: International Official Reserves to GDP -0.557 -1.415 -1.085 -0.672 -0.319 -3.181*** -0.569 -3.022*** 
 
(3.925) (3.213) (2.861) (1.660) (1.402) (1.181) (1.316) (1.147) 
Note: bootstrapped standard errors (via 500 replications) in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
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4. Robustness Checks 
To make sure that we filter out sufficiently any possible polluting effect resulting from 
observables known to affect both fiscal performances and the probability of adopting FRs, we 
augment the probit model by controlling respectively for the lagged value of the squared 
public debt (for a possible non-linearity in the effect of public debt), the logarithm of real per 
capita GDP (proxy for the level of economic development), quality of the bureaucracy (proxy 
for institutional quality), trade openness, and international official reserves to GDP.18 
Columns [2], [3], [4], [5] and [6] of Table 2 show the probit results when using FR dummy as 
the selection variable, and their corresponding results for the ATT are depicted in Table 3 
(lines [2] to [6]). The probit results when using BBR, ER and DR dummies as the selection 
variables are depicted in columns [2] to [6] of Appendices 2, 3 and 4  respectively, while their 
corresponding ATT results are depicted in lines [2] to [6] of Tables 4, 5, and 6 respectively. 
The results remain robust to these new specifications: the probit results as well as the 
estimated ATT do not change qualitatively and quantitatively.  
 
5. Exploring the heterogeneity in the treatment effect 
Even though developing countries share some common features, there exists however 
some differences between them, including inter alia, their socio-political and institutional 
contexts. They may even differ in some aspects related to the way they apply FRs. Given that 
these factors may make different, the ATT of FRs on fiscal discipline, we explore in this 
section the presence of heterogeneity in the treatment effect of FRs. We test five possible 
                                                 
18
 These variables are considered in the literature as possible determinants of the probability of FRs adoption (see, e.g., 
Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008; and IMF, 2009). 
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sources of heterogeneity: the number of FRs in place, the time length since FRs introduction, 
the presence of a supranational FR, government fractionalisation and government stability.19 
For this purpose, we use a control function regression approach, adapted from Lin and Ye 
(2009) and described as follows. We perform, within the common support from the matching 
in previous section, the simple following OLS regression: 
ititititititit X*FRXPscoreFRCAPB εθφγβα +++++=         (6). 
itPscore , the estimated propensity scores from our baseline probit model, is included as a 
control function. Xit is the set of possible sources of heterogeneity variables. The coefficient of 
the interactive term between the FR dummy and Xit,θ , catches the heterogeneity feature of 
the treatment effect of FRs.  
Table 7 below reports the estimated treatment effect of FRs on the CAPB, based on the 
control function regression approach. The first column shows a simple OLS regression linking 
the FRs dummy to the CAPB within the common support. The estimated coefficient of FRs, 
which catches the difference in mean CAPB between FRers and non-FRers, is positive and 
significantly different from zero. Then, in the second column, we include itPsocre  as a 
control function. Its estimated coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero, 
indicating that self-selection bias is at work in the evaluation of the treatment effect of FRs 
upon fiscal discipline in our sample. This justifies a posteriori the use of propensity scores-
matching in the previous section. The estimated coefficient of FR is still significantly 
different from zero but smaller in magnitude. The estimated average treatment effect of FR on 
the CAPB as GDP percentage, after controlling for self-selection is about 0.689, which is 
close to the ATT obtained from matching. The last five columns of Table 7 are devoted to 
                                                 
19
 It would be interesting to check for possible heterogeneity due to factors related to the strength of FRs (enforcement, 
monitoring, transparency and sanctions). However, the lack of such detailed data for a sufficient number of countries in our 
sample prevents us from doing so. 
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possible heterogeneity of the treatment effect of FRs, through the estimated coefficients of the 
interactive terms as described above.20 
In column [3], the estimated coefficient of the interaction of FR and the number of FRs in 
place is positive and significantly different from zero, suggesting that the more the number of 
rules in place, the larger the discipline-enhancing effect of FRs. The adoption of a constraint 
on an additional fiscal aggregate increases the treatment effect by 0.645 percentage point. It is 
worthnoting that even though this is not a real measure of the intensity of FRs, this result 
seems to indicate that the intensity in the use of FRs matters, in accordance with the existing 
literature (Debrun et al., 2008).21  
Column [4] shows that time length since FRs adoption reduce the disciplinary effect of 
FRs, as the estimated coefficient of the interaction term between FR and Time is negative and 
significantly different from zero. This suggests that the credibility component of FRs comes 
more from the “signals” they send to the public and financial markets rather than from any 
reputation acquired due to length of time in the use of FRs. Results in columns [5], [6] and [7] 
show that the treatment effect of FRs is reduced by the presence of supranational rules and 
government fragmentation whereas it is enhanced by government stability. The first result of 
this set of three may be due to the fact that supranational FRs are weakly enforced in 
developing countries, as documented in Prakash and Cabezon (2008), so that  this may result 
in negative externalities onto the national rules, leading to an overall smaller treatment effect. 
Regarding the role of government fragmentation, it is in accordance with Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) who argue that the common pool problem is expected to be stronger in fragmented and 
heterogeneous government coalitions. Finally, the enhanced treatment effect of FRs in more 
stable governments suggests that the ability of government to stay in power and carry out its 
                                                 
20
 Note that as this appears in equation (6), normally, both interacted variables, FR and Xit, should be included in the 
regression individually. But in column [3] of Table 3, we do not include Number of FRs in the regression because the 
interaction term is the same as Number of FRs. Similarly, Time is not included in the regression of column [4], because the 
interaction term is the same as Time. 
21
 It would have been more relevant to use for example the share of government finances covered by rules. But the lack of 
availability of such data in developing countries prevents us from using this measure. 
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declared programs, including the fulfilment of the announced targets for fiscal aggregates, is a 
key element of the success of FRs. 
We also explore the heterogeneity in the treatment effect of ER on the CAPE. The results 
(see Table 8) confirm the previous conditional discipline-enhancing effects of FR.  Indeed, it 
appears that while the reducing-effect of ER on the CAPE decreases with the existence of 
supranational FRs and the degree of fractionalisation of the government, it increases with the 
degree of stability of the government. However, the number of rules in place as well as the 
time length since the introduction of an ER does not influence any more significantly the 
reducing-effect of ER on the CAPE. 
 
Table 7: Heterogeneity in the treatment effect of Fiscal Rules (FRs) on Structural Primary Fiscal Balance 
Dependent Variable:  CAPB (GDP %) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
FR Dummy 0.828*** 0.689** -0.294 0.975** 0.797** 1.306*** -2.820* 
 (0.317) (0.291) (0.603) (0.400) (0.311) (0.483) (1.696) 
Propensity Score  1.570* 1.690 1.719* 1.800* 2.476** 1.993* 
  (0.801) (1.038) (1.027) (1.084) (1.094) (1.043) 
FR * Number of FRs   0.645*     
   (0.358)     
FR * Time    -0.0549*    
    (0.0309)    
Supranational Dummy     0.443   
     (0.654)   
FR * Supranational     -1.239*   
     (0.681)   
Gov. Fractionalisation      -0.419  
      (0.502)  
FR*Gov. Fractionalisation      -2.304**  
      (0.922)  
Government stability       -0.022 
       (0.072) 
FR*Government Stability       0.434** 
       (0.219) 
Observations 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 
R2 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.021 0.017 
Note: in brackets the bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications). *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. Constant terms are included but not reported. 
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Table 8: Heterogeneity in the treatment effect of ER on the CAPE (GDP %) 
Dependent Variable: CAPE (GDP %) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
ER Dummy -1.023* -0.933** -1.414 -0.911 -1.057** -2.142*** 3.501* 
 (0.522) (0.470) (1.136) (0.689) (0.519) (0.667) (2.008) 
Propensity Score  -4.381* -4.335* -4.368* -4.712* -4.863* -4.678* 
  (2.305) (2.281) (2.298) (2.480) (2.559) (2.386) 
ER * Number of FRs   0.256     
   (0.497)     
ER * Time    -0.00599    
    (0.117)    
Supranational Dummy     0.153   
     (0.335)   
ER * Supranational     1.295*   
     (0.690)   
Gov. Fractionalisation      -0.0327  
      (0.400)  
ER *Gov. Fractionalisation      4.539***  
      (1.124)  
Government stability       0.0764* 
       (0.040) 
ER *Government Stability       -0.543** 
       (0.259) 
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 762 762 
R2 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.018 0.012 
Note: ER=Expenditure Rule; CAPE: Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Expenditure. In brackets the bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 
replications). *, **,  and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Constant terms are included but not reported. 
 
 
Finally, for the sake of robustness check, we carried out the same control function 
regressions, but controlling for country-fixed and year-fixed effects this time. The main 
results remain robust to these new specifications (see Appendices 5 and 6 for the effect of FR 
on the CAPB and the effect of ER on the CAPE respectively). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyse the relationship between national fiscal rules (FRs) and fiscal 
discipline in developing countries. Based on a wide panel data of 74 developing countries 
over the period 1990-2007, this paper is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to take into 
account the self-selection problem in policy adoption while evaluating the effect of FRs on 
fiscal performances. Relying on a variety of propensity scores matching methods, which 
allows us controlling for self-selection, this paper therefore reassesses more formally the 
impact of FRs on budgetary outcomes. It finds that the Average Treatment effect (ATT) of 
FRs on the Cyclically-Adjusted Primary fiscal Balance (CAPB) is significantly positive and 
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robust to a variety of alternative specifications.The magnitude of the contribution of FRs to 
the CAPB is rather important, as FRs enhance the CAPB by at least 0.642 and up to 1.180 
percentage points of GDP. We also find that the treatment effect varies with the type of FRs: 
while Budget Balance Rules and Expenditure Rules have significant discipline-enhancing 
effects, the effect of Debt Rules appears mixed and not significantly different from zero. Last 
but not the least, we show that there is heterogeneity in the treatment effect of FRs, depending 
on countries characteristics: number of FRs in place, time length since FRs adoption, presence 
of supranational FRs, government fractionalisation and government stability. 
In terms of policy implications, this paper suggests that the introduction of rule-based 
fiscal frameworks remains a credible remedy for governments in developing countries against 
fiscal indiscipline. This is particularly important in the current context, where the 
implementation of massive stimulus plans has eroded fiscal positions in many countries, 
which commands to undertake credible measures to put back public finances on a sustainable 
path. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the simple adoption of FRs is not 
sufficient to guarantee fiscal credibility and fiscal discipline. Their adoption must be 
accompanied with a set of other measures, beyond the scope of this study, but essential to the 
success of FRs. Such measures include inter alia, fiscal transparency, fiscal responsibility, 
enforcement mechanisms, sanctions and independent fiscal institutions (fiscal councils). 
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Appendix 2: Probit estimates of the propensity scores (With BBR as dependent variable) 
Dependent Variable BBR Dummy Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
CAPB (GDP%) lagged one year 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.076*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) 
Public Debt (GDP %) lagged one year 0.003 0.016*** 0.004* 0.004 0.003 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Real per capita GDP growth rate 0.013 0.001 0.017 0.023 0.015 0.016 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Dependency ratio -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.016** -0.019*** -0.028*** -0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Government stability -0.153*** -0.156*** -0.146*** -0.138*** -0.157*** -0.138*** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) 
Government fractionalisation 0.781*** 0.790*** 0.799*** 0.756*** 0.747*** 0.833*** 
 (0.249) (0.256) (0.247) (0.251) (0.248) (0.260) 
Inflation -0.039*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.046*** -0.041*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Supranational FR Dummy -0.534* -0.722** -0.624** -0.564* -0.325 -0.557** 
 (0.283) (0.291) (0.281) (0.295) (0.285) (0.280) 
Squared public debt (lagged one year)  -0.334***     
  (0.089)     
Logarithm of Real per capita GDP   0.298*    
   (0.155)    
Quality of the bureaucracy    0.311***   
    (0.084)   
Trade Openness     -0.005**  
     (0.002)  
International Official Reserves to GDP      -0.035*** 
      (0.010) 
Number of observations 772 772 772 772 772 757 
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.174 0.151 0.163 0.154 0.169 
BBR=Budget Balance Rule. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Constants included (but not reported). *, **, and ***: 
significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
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Appendix 3: Probit estimates of the propensity scores (With ER as dependent variable) 
Dependent Variable ER Dummy Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
CAPB (GDP%) lagged one year 0.072** 0.074*** 0.073** 0.072** 0.068** 0.071*** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.028) 
Public Debt (GDP %) lagged one year -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Real per capita GDP growth rate 0.023 0.020 0.032* 0.027 0.029 0.023 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Dependency ratio -0.012* -0.011* 0.010 -0.009 -0.014* -0.012* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Government stability -0.092** -0.095** -0.079 -0.083* -0.095** -0.107** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) 
Government fractionalisation -0.003 0.005 0.064 -0.020 -0.070 0.006 
 (0.312) (0.311) (0.313) (0.317) (0.303) (0.314) 
Inflation -0.010** -0.010** -0.011** -0.010** -0.013** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Supranational FR Dummy -0.138 -0.159 -0.345 -0.147 0.108 -0.142 
 (0.273) (0.281) (0.284) (0.276) (0.268) (0.273) 
Squared public debt (lagged one year)  -0.111     
  (0.106)     
Logarithm of Real per capita GDP   0.847***    
   (0.171)    
Quality of the bureaucracy    0.130   
    (0.090)   
Trade Openness     -0.006**  
     (0.002)  
International Official Reserves to GDP      0.008** 
      (0.004) 
Number of observations 772 772 772 772 772 757 
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.080 0.136 0.081 0.093 0.087 
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Constants included (but not reported).*, **, and ***: significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
 
Appendix 4: Probit estimates of the propensity scores (With DR as dependent variable) 
Dependent Variable DR Dummy Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
CAPB (GDP%) lagged one year 0.032* 0.029 0.034* 0.030* 0.029* 0.038** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
Public Debt (GDP %) lagged one year 0.004** -0.018** 0.003 0.004** 0.004** 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Real per capita GDP growth rate -0.0005 0.010 -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Dependency ratio -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.014** -0.022*** -0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Government stability -0.109*** -0.113*** -0.114*** -0.099*** -0.115*** -0.093*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
Government fractionalisation 0.277 0.256 0.266 0.282 0.226 0.290 
 (0.212) (0.217) (0.215) (0.215) (0.207) (0.214) 
Inflation -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Supranational FR Dummy -0.047 0.060 0.020 -0.044 0.146 -0.046 
 (0.211) (0.221) (0.217) (0.214) (0.223) (0.213) 
Squared public debt (lagged one year)  0.628***     
  (0.174)     
Logarithm of Real per capita GDP   -0.238*    
   (0.132)    
Quality of the bureaucracy    0.157**   
    (0.068)   
Trade Openness     -0.006***  
     (0.002)  
International Official Reserves to GDP      -0.028*** 
      (0.010) 
Number of observations 772 772 772 772 772 757 
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.111 0.079 0.079 0.090 0.094 
DR=Debt Rule. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Constants included (but not reported).*, **, and ***: significance level of 
10%, 5%, and 1%  
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Appendix 5: Heterogeneity in the treatment effect of FR on the CAPB (Country & Time Fixed Effect 
Estimations) 
Dependent Variable:  CAPB (GDP %) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
FR Dummy 2.660** 2.430** -0.266 2.281** 2.607** 3.041** -1.931 
 (1.208) (1.133) (2.199) (1.019) (1.134) (1.415) (2.866) 
Propensity Score  4.513* 4.355* 4.398* 4.660* 5.354* 6.053** 
  (2.302) (2.222) (2.243) (2.817) (2.813) (2.912) 
FR * Number of FRs   1.671*     
   (0.852)     
FR * Time    0.0709    
    (0.279)    
Supranational Dummy     1.199*   
     (0.612)   
FR * Supranational     -1.875*   
     (0.956)   
Gov. Fractionalisation      -0.730  
      (0.887)  
FR *Gov. Fractionalisation      -3.893*  
      (1.986)  
Government stability       0.093 
       (0.159) 
FR *Government Stability       0.531* 
       (0.271) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 
R2 0.133 0.141 0.152 0.141 0.145 0.152 0.150 
Note: FR=Fiscal Rule; CAPB: Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Balance. In brackets the bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications). *, 






Appendix 6: Heterogeneity in the treatment effect of ER on the CAPE (Country & Time Fixed Effect Estimations) 
Dependent Variable:  CAPE (GDP %) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
ER Dummy -3.048** -2.523* -3.376 -2.470 -2.766* -4.873*** 3.728 
 (1.456) (1.418) (2.491) (1.748) (1.603) (1.436) (2.706) 
Propensity Score  -21.55*** -21.77*** -21.51*** -21.23** -21.78*** -20.62** 
  (8.240) (8.303) (8.242) (8.258) (8.365) (8.128) 
ER * Number of FRs   0.486     
   (1.582)     
ER * Time    -0.015    
    (0.215)    
Supranational Dummy     0.642   
     (0.808)   
ER * Supranational     1.996*   
     (1.018)   
Gov. Fractionalisation      -0.070  
      (0.826)  
ER *Gov. Fractionalisation      8.986***  
      (2.263)  
Government stability       0.209* 
       (0.107) 
ER *Government Stability       -0.751** 
       (0.319) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 762 762 762 762 762 762 762 
R2 0.127 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.147 0.170 0.152 
Note: ER=Expenditure Rule; CAPE=Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Expenditure. In brackets the bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 
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Data Source: World Economic Outlook, WEO (2011)
FR_treated Vs. FR_non-treated
Fig.1: Structural primary fiscal balance, 1990-2007



































Data Source: World Economic Outlook, WEO (2011)
FR_treated Vs. FR_non-treated
Fig.2: Structural primary expenditure, 1990-2007
Pre-FR period Post-FR period







Appendix 8: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Fiscal Balance (GDP %) 1074 0.016 3.492 -18.344 24.618 
Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Expenditure (GDP %) 1075 -0.188 3.660 -26.182 25.411 
Government Debt (GDP %) 1195 56.838 41.593 3.742 454.864 
Fiscal Rule (FR) 1332 0.131 0.337 0.000 1.000 
Budget Balance Rule (BBR) 1332 0.092 0.289 0.000 1.000 
Expenditure Rule (ER) 1332 0.035 0.185 0.000 1.000 
Revenue Rule (RR) 1332 0.013 0.112 0.000 1.000 
Debt Rule (DR) 1332 0.068 0.251 0.000 1.000 
Supranational Dummy 1314 0.066 0.249 0.000 1.000 
Real per capita GDP growth rate 1280 2.670 5.803 -32.935 44.281 
Dependency ratio 1332 64.997 16.581 38.100 106.900 
Government stability 1118 8.008 2.003 1.000 12.000 
Government Fractionalisation 1197 0.224 0.273 0.000 0.893 
Inflation 1279 55.109 340.794 -11.686 7481.664 
Number of FR 1332 0.191 0.543 0.000 3.000 
Time since FR adoption 1332 0.748 2.894 0.000 28.000 
Real per capita GDP 1292 7223.490 4777.399 955.786 26306.430 
Quality of the bureaucracy 1118 2.023 0.845 0 4 
Trade Openness 1292 80.787 41.214 10.094 222.288 




























Data Source: World Economic Outlook, WEO (2011)
FR_treated Vs. FR_non-treated
Fig.3: Gross Public Debt, 1990-2007
Pre-FR period Post-FR period
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Appendix 9: Sources and definitions of data 
Variables Definition Sources 
Fiscal Rule (FR) Dummy Variable taking the value 1 if in a given year a country has in 








Fiscal Rules Database by the 
IMF’s Fiscal Affairs 
Department, Fiscal Policy and 




Budget Balance Rule (BBR) 
 
 
Expenditure Rule (ER) 
 
 
Revenue Rule (RR) 
 
 




Dummy Variable taking the value 1 if in a given year a country has in 
place, a national numerical constraint on government Fiscal Balance. 
 
Dummy Variable taking the value 1 if in a given year a country has in 
place, a national numerical constraint on government Expenditure. 
 
Dummy Variable taking the value 1 if in a given year a country has in 
place, a national numerical constraint on government Revenue. 
 
Dummy Variable taking the value 1 if in a given year a country has in 
place, a national numerical constraint on government Debt. 
 
Dummy Variable taking the value 1 if in a given year a country has in 
place, a supranational numerical constraint on government fiscal 
aggregates. 
 
Structural Primary Fiscal Balance  
 
 
Structural Primary Expenditure 
 
Difference between General Government revenue and expenditure 
(excluding interest payments), adjusted for business fluctuations, as GDP 
percentage. 
 
General government expenditure excluding interest payments, adjusted for 
business fluctuations, as GDP percentage. 
 
 
World Economic Outlook    
(WEO, 2010) and Own 
calculations 
Government Debt Gross General government debt, as GDP percentage Ali Abbas et al. (2010) 
Real  per capita GDP growth rate Annual growth rate of real output per capita 
 
Penn World Table (PWT6.2) Trade Openness Sum of imports and exports divided by GDP 
Real per capita GDP GDP per capita at constant prices. 
Inflation 
 
Annual growth rate of average CPI World Economic Outlook    (WEO, 2010) 
 
Government stability 
Index ranging from 0 to 12 and measuring the ability of government to stay 
in office and to carry out its declared program(s).The higher the index, the 





International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG, 2009) 
Quality of the bureaucracy 
Index ranging from 0 to 4 and measuring the institutional strength and 
expertise that the bureaucracy has to govern without drastic changes in 
policy or interruptions in government services. 
 
Government Fractionalisation 
Index measuring the Probability that two deputies picked at random among 
from the government parties will be of different parties. 
World Bank Database of 
Political Institutions (2010) 
Dependency Ratio Ratio of dependents (people younger than 15 or older than 64) to working-





World Development Indicators 
(WDI, 2010) 
 
Total Official reserves 
Total reserves comprise holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, 
reserves of IMF members held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign 
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Appendix 10: Strength of the instruments in the 2SLS estimations of the CAPB (key test statistics) 
Country 1st step F-Statistic Shea's Partial R2 Country 1st step F-Statistic Shea's Partial R2 
Albania 4,026 20,609 Jamaica 16,110 38,874 
Algeria 13,495 40,149 Jordan 7,185 96,424 
Angola 29,271 66,217 Kazakhstan 6,949 78,133 
Argentina 19,860 39,684 Kenya 30,856 55,671 
Azerbaijan 15,210 47,783 Korea, South 4,845 20,089 
Bahrain 12,149 12,679 Latvia 54,175 85,632 
Bangladesh 17,237 33,684 Lesotho 8,621 20,203 
Belarus 14,547 68,915 Lithuania 15,126 39,706 
Bolivia 38,734 58,501 Malaysia 25,590 42,945 
Botswana 34,775 58,553 Mauritius 16,772 34,126 
Brazil 14,882 32,015 Mexico 14,064 23,990 
Bulgaria 30,449 68,911 Mongolia 21,202 51,623 
Cameroon 67,185 73,437 Morocco 5,481 8,164 
Cape Verde 5,934 2,560 Mozambique 5,291 8,672 
Chad 13,706 27,429 Nigeria 19,133 34,812 
Chile 11,241 24,787 Pakistan 24,702 27,497 
China 29,767 87,034 Panama 14,167 32,855 
Colombia 46,529 58,981 Paraguay 4,440 88,059 
Congo 18,401 1,795 Peru 25,213 59,021 
Costa Rica 12,219 49,645 Philippines 4,010 29,161 
Cote d'Ivoire 38,633 53,911 Poland 6,978 29,281 
Croatia 42,304 82,674 Romania 6,466 20,803 
Czech Republic 14,792 62,529 Russia 33,342 41,799 
Dominican Republic 14,208 48,548 Serbia 4,305 14,683 
Ecuador 10,121 53,928 Slovakia 12,194 55,197 
Egypt 16,883 28,922 South Africa 25,328 69,019 
El Salvador 15,579 49,139 Sri Lanka 23,466 44,097 
Estonia 18,083 74,633 Sudan 6,305 12,588 
Fiji 4,012 2,602 Swaziland 14,378 29,410 
Gabon 6,688 9,525 Syria 4,977 10,862 
Georgia 8,767 41,462 Thailand 17,639 40,194 
Guatemala 7,506 25,355 Trinidad & Tobago 6,130 35,457 
Hungary 85,210 45,385 Tunisia 6,358 3,690 
India 20,087 51,373 Turkey 7,325 23,807 
Indonesia 338,076 98,888 Ukraine 97,600 98,079 
Iran 17,732 41,941 Uruguay 23,414 47,324 
Israel 4,005 53,022 Venezuela 10,001 35,960 
 
 
